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Book Reviews

POLffiCAL
GERRYMANDERING
AND
THE
COURTS.* Edited by Bernard Grofman.t New York:
Agathon Press. 1990. Pp. xiv, 335. $36.00.
Ward Elliott 2
Political Gerrymandering and the Courts is a collection of essays by sixteen districting experts on the question "What can social
scientists offer to help courts solve the problem of egregious partisan gerrymanders?" The question implies its own subsidiary questions, such as:
1) Are there such things as egregious partisan gerrymanders?
2) If so, how can you tell how egregious they are?
3) What can courts do about it?
4) And what can political scientists do about it?
Since the Supreme Court came closest to considering these
questions in Davis v. Bandemer,J the book may also be considered a
series of reflections on the meaning of that case. It is also some• This collection consists of the following essays: Bernard Grofman, Unresolved Issues in Partisan Gerrymandering Litigation; Gordon E. Baker, The Unfinished Reapportionment ReWJlution; Bernard Grofman, Toward a Coherent Theory of Gerrymandering:
Bandemer and Thornburg; Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Bandemer's Gap: Gerrymandering and
Equal Protection; Bruce E. Cain, Perspecti-ves on Davis v. Bandemer: Views of the Proctitioner, Theorist, and Reformer; Charles Backstrom, Leonard Robins, and Scott Eller, Establishing a Statewide Electoral Effects Baseline; Richard G. Niemi, The Swing Ratio as a
Measure of Partisan Gerrymandering; Michael D. McDonald and Richard L. Engstrom, Detecting Gerrymandering; Gordon E. Baker, The "Totality of Circumstances" Approach; Richard Morrill, A Geographer's Perspecti-ve; Peter Schuck, Partisan Gerrymandering: A Political
Problem Without Judicial Solution; Richard Niemi and John Wilkerson, Compactness and the
1980s Districts in the Indiana State House: Evidence of Political Gerrymandering?; Richard
Niemi and Stephen G. Wright, Majority-Win Percentages: An Approach to the Votes-Seats
Relationship in Light of Davis v. Bandemer; Thomas Hofeller and Bernard Grofman, Comporing the Compactness of California Congressional Districts Under Three Different Plans:
1980, 1982 and 1984; Samuel Kernell and Bernard Grofman, Determining the Predictability
of Partisan Voting Patterns in California Elections, 1978-1984; Gordon E. Baker, Lessons
from the 1973 California Masters' Plan.
I. Professor of Political Science, University of California, Irvine.
2. Professor of Government, Claremont McKenna College.
3. 478 u.s. 109 (1986).
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thing of a reunion of contributors to a 1985 UCLA Law Review
Symposium on gerrymandering. 4
All the contributors seem to agree that there are such things as
gerrymanders, electoral districts drawn up to give some people advantage over others. Almost all seem to agree that some gerrymanders are egregious, in the sense of shocking the conscience and
calling for some kind of remedial action. Thirteen of the contributors are shocked by egregious partisan gerrymanders, believe courts
should do something about them, and believe that political scientists can provide courts with standards to single out and curb the
worst cases. This group, led by the editor, Bernard Grofman, and
by Gordon Baker (whose pioneering book, Rural Versus Urban
Political Power,s set the stage for the reapportionment revolution)
interprets Bandemer as commendably favorable to such
intervention.
Two of the three remaining contributors, Daniel Lowenstein
and Bruce Cain, are shocked by racial but not by partisan gerrymanders. They deny that political scientists or courts can find satisfactory standards for identifying partisan gerrymanders, far less
regulating them-though neither of these dissenters seems to have
much trouble identifying and regulating racial gerrymanders of the
wrong sort, and replacing them with benign, "affirmative action"
racial gerrymanders. Lowenstein, in particular, sees Bandemer as
commendably closed to intervention against partisan gerrymanders.
The final dissenter, Peter Schuck, reads Bandemer as favorable
to intervention, but unduly so because he considers intervention a
grave error, a cure worse than the disease. He has little to say about
racial gerrymanders, either in his chapter or in the article from
which it is extracted.6 But he elsewhere reveals himself as an admirer of Abigail Themstrom's Whose Votes Count?7 and hence
must be counted a critic of massive judicial intervention against racial gerrymanders. s
In sum, the book is dominated by a large, interventionist majority on the one hand, confident that they can help courts identify
and control both partisan and racial gerrymanders, and thinking
they have a green light from the Supreme Court in Bandemer. A
4. 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1985).
5. Gordon E. Baker, Rural Venus Urban Political Power (Doubleday, 1955).
6. Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1325, 1326 (1987).
7. Abigail M. Themstrom, Whose Votes Count?: Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights (Harv. U. Press, 1987) ("Whose Votes Countr').
8. Peter H. Schuck, What Went Wrong With the Voting Rights Act, 19 Washington
Monthly 51 (Nov. 1987).
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small trio of dissenters is divided both as to whether Bandemer
gives a green light against partisan gerrymanders, and as to whether
it is wise in principle for courts to intervene against racial gerrymanders. But the dissenters are united in their belief that courts
should keep hands off partisan gerrymanders.
In some ways the actual gist of Bandemer is less interesting
now than it was in 1987 when this book took shape, though
Grofman was not wrong at the time to call it "potentially the most
important districting case since Reynolds v. Sims." Bandemer on its
face could be read to support either the green-light or the red-light
interpretation. On the one hand, the Court declined to strike down
a blatant gerrymander, which gave Republicans half again as many
seats per vote as Democrats in the 1982 elections to the Indiana
House. On the other hand, a plurality of the Justices declared in
dictum in favor of the intervention against egregious gerrymandering which would "consistently degrade a voter's ... influence on the
political process." Surely this dictum could constitute at least a yellow light for intervention, especially considering the land-office
business the courts and the Justice Department were doing at the
same time in striking down supposed racial gerrymanders and replacing them with other racial gerrymanders thought to be more
favorable to blacks and hispanics.9
But whatever hint of a green light Bandemer may once have
flashed must have been extinguished by the Court's refusal to hear
Badham v. Eu 10 in 1988-after Political Gerrymandering and the
Courts had been sent to the printer. One may argue whether
Bandemer, which involved one gerrymandered election in one
house, was the second most egregious partisan gerrymander of the
1980's, but there is no doubt which one was first. That distinction
belongs to the California gerrymanders created in part by Professor
Cain, 11 attacked by Republicans in Badham, and defended in an
amicus brief by Professor Lowenstein, among others.12 Badham
9. See, for example, Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), decided the same day as
Bandemer, on evidence supplied by Bernard Grofman. Abigail Thernstrom provides a comprehensive survey of the drastic change in the Voting Rights Act's emphasis from enfranchising Southern blacks to giving blacks and hispanics across the nation a statutory right to
court-ordered gerrymanders guaranteeing "representation" proportional to their numbers.
Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? (cited in note 7).
10. 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1983), dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction, 488 U.S. 804
(1988).
II. Bruce E. Cain, The Reapponionment Puzzle (U. of California Press, 1984). He was
special consultant to the California Assembly Elections and Reapportionment Committee in
1981.
12. Bernard Grofman, ed., Political Gerrymandering and the Couns 104 n.3 (Agathon
Press, 1990) ("Political Gerrymandering"). He was consultant to the Democratic members of
the House of Representatives in districting litigation throughout the 1980's (id. at xii).
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involved four or five successive elections and a pro-Democrat, proincumbent gerrymandering so tight that only one district of 135
changed party hands. District boundaries wandered wildly across
mountains, deserts, and bays, chopping up cities and counties.
Some districts were spliced together with narrow strips of beach or
highway dividers.B For a decade, Democrats had half again as
many seats per vote in Congress as Republicans.
The moment the Court decided not to hear Badham, any
thought of judicial control of gerrymanders under Bandemer evaporated. Bandemer in 1987 was at least a pitcher's scowl at the
baserunner to threaten a pick-off if he was too far off-base. Ignoring
the Badham gerrymander was as clear a signal as the Court could
give (short of saying so) that there will never be any pick-oft's, even
for the most brazen attempts to steal a base. Savvy coaches like
Professors Cain and Lowenstein, and the other architects and defenders of the California gerrymander, sensed this years before Badham, gave the steal sign, and got away with it-just as the chief
gerrymanderer, the late Congressman Philip Burton (D, Calif.) had
predicted. "Who will stop us?" he crowed.
Is this as it should be? The arguments on either side may be
briefly summarized. In one sense, Gordon Baker is perfectly right:
the reapportionment revolution was about "achieving fair and effective representation for all citizens," (Reynolds v. Sims) and debasing
or diluting people's votes by gerrymandering is hardly less unfair
than doing it by disfranchisement or malapportionment.'• And
Grofman, Morill, Niemi, Backstrom, Engstrom, Hofeller, and the
other districting-expert contributors, are right that dozens of technical criteria exist to measure compactness, group polarization,
electoral effects baselines, swing ratios, and so on. There are also
dozens of technical remedies which a court could order, if so disposed, to limit gerrymandering. Some of these have been used to
detect and curb racial gerrymanders. Why not put some of them to
work to curb the most egregious partisan gerrymanders?
Professors Lowenstein and Cain are less forthright on this
question in this book than in their earlier works. The 1985 Lowenstein rebuttal to the reformers was an assertion that neutral-looking,
anti-gerrymandering criteria were not neutral in practice; that compactness and contiguity standards, for example, amounted to a
"Republican Trojan horse," which would pack already-overconcen13. See, for example, the illustrations in Ward Elliott, Review of The Reapportionment
Puzzle, 2 Const. Comm. 203, 206 (1985).
14. Gordon E. Baker, The Unfinished Reapportionment Revolution, Ch. 2 in Grofman,
ed., Political Gerrymandering at 11-25 (cited in note 12).
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trated minority populations into safe but vote-wasting ghettoized
districts.ls As Gordon Baker notes, this assertion was "not based
on any concrete evidence" and was refuted by California's actual
experience with court-ordered, criteria-driven districts in the
1970's.t6 The 1990 Lowenstein position is that, under his tidied-up
interpretation of Bandemer, the whole issue has been settled by the
Supreme Court, obviating the need for further discussion on the
merits, save for the possibility that a future resurgence of "some
variant of McCarthyism" might call for protecting "outcast political groups" where other constitutional protections were not available.t7 Surely no major political party could be considered an
outcast so defined.
Bruce Cain in 1984 defended his gerrymander on much the
same grounds as Lowenstein; it was an "affirmative action gerrymander" to protect "weak" Democrat client groups, while giving
extra stability and governing power to the ruling Democratic coalition-which, he argues, should be the sole judge of the wisdom and
fairness of any apportionment plan.ts I have elsewhere criticized
this line as transparently partisan,t9 and he does not repeat it in the
Grofman symposium. His 1990 treatment is more abstract and
open-ended, with much weighing and balancing of individual and
group rights, and of symmetrical and asymmetrical ways of treating
racial and partisan gerrymanders, and less of a preference for letting
regnant Democratic legislators make all the decisions. He does
come out for legitimacy, stability, and workability, and against proportional representation (PR) as antithetical to all three. He recommends a " 'subjective' bipartisan" process for redistricting,
involving input by both parties, and a supermajority rule to give the
minority party some leverage.2o
Peter Schuck, the farthest removed of the contributors from
the California battle lines, is also the most forthright and
Frankfurterian in opposing intervention on the merits. "A court,"
he argues, "cannot determine whether and to what extent a districting plan 'will consistently degrade a ... group of voters' influence
15. Daniel Lowenstein and Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in
the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory? 33 UCLA L. Rev. I, 27, 34 (1985).
16. Gordon F. Baker, Lessons from the 1973 Master's Plan, Ch. 16 in Grofman, ed.,
Political Gerrymandering at 302 (cited in note 12).
17. Daniel Lowenstein, Bandemer's Gap: Gerrymandering and Equal Protection, Ch. 4
in Grofman, ed., Political Gerrymandering at 102 (cited in note 12).
18. Cain, The Reapponionment Puzzle at 77, 188-91 (cited in note II).
19. Elliott, 2 Const. Comm. at 207 (cited in note 13).
20. Bruce E. Cain, Perspectives on Davis v. Bandemer: Views of the Practitioner, Theorist, and Reformer, Ch. 5 in Grofman, ed., Political Gerrymandering at 128-40 (cited in note
12).
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on the political process as a whole.' " The political process is too
complicated to be settled with the kind of simple rules a court must
use to be understandable. "Representation" and "fair representation" can mean too many different things. PR, the simple, straight
road to proportionality, was also the simple, straight road to political paralysis for the Weimar Republic, the Fourth French Republic, and Italy today. No one should want it. Nor should anyone
want its not-so-straight, not-so-simple surrogates, which could be
both dangerous and incomprehensible. The Court properly rejected
proportionality as a standard, but offered no other standard in its
place. "In effect, the court would be prescribing the partisan configuration of the legislature-the most political of tasks-and doing so
on the basis of inevitably conflicting, inconclusive expert testimony
about the uses and implications of such tests. This is surely a chilling prospect.''2t
What can one take away from this book? (1) A compendium
of political-science techniques for identifying and dealing with gerrymanders. (2) Intriguing surveys of the extent of gerrymandering
in various states. (3) Discussions of the California and Indiana experiences. (4) Some gifted and occasionally dazzling exegesis of
Bandemer, a case which, however, has been overtaken by events.
And (5) the beginnings, but only the beginnings, of a debate over
the proper scope of the reapportionment revolution.
What is missing from the book? (1) Four-fifths of Peter
Schuck's article. (2) Discussion of the extent to which the refusal to
hear Badham v. Eu made Bandemer a dead letter. (3) Discussion of
the secondary effects of partisan gerrymandering in states like California. Has it lessened competitiveness? Cohesiveness? Workability? Responsiveness? Has it polarized the legislature? Has it
increased recourse to initiatives and referenda? (4) Discussion of
the extent to which Madisonian checks and balances can curb the
excesses of a gerrymandering faction, absent judicial intervention.
The record, even in California, is not as bad as some think. (5) A
serious rejoinder by the anti-interventionists to Gordon Baker's
question about why courts are considered so well suited to control
malapportionment, but so poorly to control gerrymanders. And (6)
a serious rejoinder to Grofman's question about why courts are considered so well suited to control racial gerrymanders, but so poorly
for partisan.
Felix Frankfurter thought representation questions were a
thicket and a quagmire, too standards-resistant and too "political"
21. Peter H. Schuck, Partisan Gerrymandering: A Political Problem Without Judicial
Solution, Ch. 11 in Grofman, ed., Political Gerrymandering at 241 (cited in note 12).
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for a court to tackle. The majority in Baker v. Carr (1962) and
Reynolds v. Sims (1964) thought not. Which was right? The Court
has had many subsequent opportunities to intervene in representation questions, many of which are discussed in this book. It will
doubtless have many more in years to come. This book tells us
much about an important branch of the representation debate. But
what does the branch tell us about the tree?
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James W. Ely, Jr. s
As these books demonstrate, judicial and scholarly interest in
I. Director, Landmark Legal Foundation Center for Civil Rights.
2. Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
3. This collection consists of the following essays: C. Thomas Williamson, Ill, Constitutional and Judicial Limitations on the Community's Power to Downzone; Robert E. Manley,
Inverse Condemnation Under42 U.S. C. Section 1983; Margaret V. Lang, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City: Fairness and Accommodation Show the Way Out of the
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Planning.
4. Member, State of Washington Bar and Vice Chair of American Bar Association
Land Use Planning and Zoning Committee.
5. Professor of Law and History, Vanderbilt University.

